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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
WALTER WAGONER,

]

Plaintiff/Appellant, ]
vs.

]

WATERSLIDE INCORPORATED dba
BURCHCREEK WATERSLIDE,

;
;
•
Defendant/Respondent. )

Case No. 20410

)

vs.

GREAT BASIN ENGINEERING,

]

Third-Party Defendant.'
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a negligence action by plaintiff against defendant in which plaintiff alleged he was injured while a business
visitor at defendant's water slide.

Defendant filed a third-

party complaint for contribution against thrid-party defendant,
Great Basin Engineering.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case was tried to a jury on October 2 and 3, 1984,
Honorable John F. Wahlquist presiding.
dict in favor of third-party defendant.

The court directed a verThe jury returned a ver-

dict against plaintiff on the complaint, finding that defendant
was not negligent, and the court entered judgment on the verdict
for defendant.

Plaintiff's motion for a new trial was denied.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks affirmance of the trial court judgment
based on the jury verdict in its favor.

Third-party defendant is

not a party to this appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is a negligence action by plaintiff Walter Wagoner
against the owner/operator of the Burchcreek Waterslide in Ogden,
Utah, for an injury to plaintiff's right large toe while he was
using the water slide.

This water slide is open similar to a

bathtub, rather than being a closed tube.

It is made of

fiberglass sections bolted together to form a continuous slide.
Neal Citte assembled it in 1979 and owned it with his father as a
family business.

He purchased the fiberglass sections from the

manufacturer, Professional Fiberglass Products, Inc., an Oklahoma
company.

The sections are 52 inches wide at the widest part.

The side wall extends up 34 1/2 inches to form a smooth lip
rounded on three sides.

Beyond the rounded lip or rim, the

fiberglass extends out horizontally a few more inches.

(Trial

Exhibit 1P, pp. 12 and 14 of which are attached in the Addendum
to this Brief)

This fiberglass edge was not sharp, but was

simply the unfinished end of the piece of fiberglass, unfinished
so that it was not smooth to the touch.
Exhibits 20D, 21D, 22D.

(R. p. 432; Trial

Trial Exhibit 20D is attached in the

Addendum to this Brief.)
Plaintiff was 28 years old at the time of the accident.
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He was using the water slide as a paying customer, along with his
wife and children, his wife's adult brothers, and one of their
friends.

On the day of the accident, he had made five or six

complete trips down the slide before the trip on which he was
injured.

Then as he was riding on his stomach on the plastic mat

provided by defendant, he went around a curve on the slide and
apparently allowed his right foot to hang over the side beyond
the rounded lip, and cut the top of his right large toe as it
scraped along the unfinished outside edge of fiberglass.
Plaintiff was treated as an out-patient at McKay-Dee
Hospital and went home that night.
accident, he reinjured his toe.

About three weeks after the

This subsequent injury greatly

complicated his recovery.
The unfinished edge on which plaintiff cut his toe, is
present on both sides of the slide for the entire length of the
slide.

The fiberglass sections were supplied in that condition

from the manufacturer, and defendant assembled them according to
the manufacturer's directions.

There was nothing broken or out

of repair which caused the accident.

Defendant's employees

inspected and maintained the slide conscientiously, and supervised its

use

by customers.

Large signs were posted displaying

safety rules.
There was substantial competent evidence that the
unfinished fiberglass edge is open and obvious to anyone
approaching the slide or using it; that riders are able to
control their arms and legs in order to keep their hands and feet
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from coming near the unfinished edge; and that riders do not get
near the outside edge unless they engage in horseplay in violation of posted safety rules.
Two of defendant's former employees testified that they
observed plaintiff engaging in horseplay on the slide, warned him
to stop on more than one occasion, and observed him continue to
misbehave.
In the six years this water slide had been in operation
up to the time of trial, over one million rides had been taken
and plaintiff was the only person ever to cut himself on the
fiberglass edge.
Two witnesses testified as experts on the design and
construction of the water slide.

Both Val T. Stratford and Neal

Citte gave the opinion that the fiberglass edge was not an
unreasonable risk to users of the water slide.
The trial court instructed the jury fully on the applicable law, including the general definition of negligence (R. p.
358) and the application of that standard to the condition of the
water slide as it existed at the time of plaintiff's injury.

(R.

p. 352)
The court instructed the jury to determine whether or
not the defendant was negligent with respect to the unfinished
fiberglass edge on the slide and thereby exposed plaintiff to an
unreasonable risk of injury.

(Interrogatory No. 1 , R. p. 351)

The jury answered this interrogatory in the negative, and
according to the court's instructions in that event, the jury
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returned a verdict without answering further interrogatories.
Based on the jury verdict, judgment was entered for defendant.
(R. pp. 389-390.

A copy of the special verdict containing the

court's instruction on reasonable risk and unreasonable risk, the
instruction defining negligence, and the judgment on the jury
verdict, R. pp. 350-358 and 389-390, are attached in the Addendum
to this Brief)
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Whether plaintiff's claim that the trial court com-

mitted reversable error in not instructing the jury on the duty
of a possessor of land to warn business invitees of conditions on
the land which involve an unreasonable risk of harm, is a claim
of harmless error.
2(a).

Whether plaintiff waived his right to complain

about the instruction given to the jury on the definition of
"unreasonable risk" by his failure to object at trial and his
failure to submit a proposed instruction.
2(b).

Whether the instructions to the jury read

together as a whole, adequately informed the jury about the legal
concept of "unreasonable risk.11
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The affirmative duty of a possessor of land to exercise
reasonable care to protect invitees by warning or repair, extends
only to conditions or activities on the land which present an
unreasonable risk of harm.

The jury found that the condition of
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which plaintiff complains did not involve unreasonable risk of
harm.

Therefore, the jury was not required to reach the question

of whether defendant breached a duty to warn, and any lack of
instruction to the jury on duty to warn was harmless to the
outcome.
In any event, there was no duty to warn of this condition which was as open and obvious to plaintiff as to
defendant.
Plaintiff waived any claim of error in the jury instructions on the definition of unreasonable risk because he did not
object to the instructions given by the court, nor did he request
the instructions he urges for the first time on appeal.
The court instructed the jury properly and adequately on
the definition of unreasonable risk and the definition of negligence.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE WAS NO REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON DUTY TO WARN.
Plaintiff asserts that the trial court did not correctly
instruct the jury on the duty to warn about hazardous conditions.
Any claim of inadequate instruction to the jury on the duty to
warn is a claim of harmless error, because having found the condition of the water slide not to be an unreasonable risk, the
jury was not required to reach the separate issue of whether
defendant had given adequate warning of the condition.

-6-

The standards for determining legal liability in this
case are set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) as
follows:
TITLE E. SPECIAL LIABILITY OF POSSESSORS
OF LAND TO INVITEES
§343.

Dangerous Conditions Known to or
Discoverable by Possessor

A possessor of land is subject to
liability for physical harm caused to his
invitees by a condition on the land if,
but only if, he
(a) knows or by the exercise of
reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize that it
involves an unreasonable risk of harm to
such invitees, and
(b) should expect that they will not
discover or realize the danger, or will
fail to protect themselves against it, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care
to protect them against the danger.
Jury Instruction Forms for Utah states the rule in
substantially the same terras:
43.10
Duty Toward Business Visitor
One who extends to a business visitor
[invitee] an invitation, express or
implied, [is] obliged to refrain from acts
of negligence and to exercise ordinary
care to keep the premises in a condition
reasonably safe for the business visitor
[invitee] [and for any chattels brought to
the premises by him [her] in the reasonable pursuit of a purpose embraced within
the invitation].
In the absence of appearances that
caution [him], or would caution a reason-
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ably prudent person in like position, to
the contrary, the business visitor
[invitee] has a right to assume that the
premises he [she] was invited to enter
are reasonably safe for the purposes for
which the invitation was extended, and to
act on that assumption.
But the responsibility of one having
control of the premises is not absolute;
it is not that of an insurer. If there is
danger attending upon the entry, or upon
the work which the business visitor
[invitee] is to do on the premises, and if
such danger arises from conditions not
readily apparent to the senses, and if the
owner [occupant] has actual knowledge of
them, or if they are discoverable by [him]
[it] in the exercise of ordinary care, it
is [his] duty to give reasonable warning
of such danger to the business visitor
[invitee]. The owner [occupant] is not
bound to discover defects which reasonable
inspection would not disclose, and [he] is
entitled to assume that the business
visitor [invitee] will perceive that which
would be obvious to [him] upon the ordinary
use of [his] own senses. There is no duty
to give the business visitor [invitee]
notice of an obvious danger.
Plaintiff's claim of error by the court in not
instructing the jury on duty to warn is at best harmless error.
Before the jury reached the question of the duty owed by defendant to its business patrons to exercise reasonable care to protect them by repair or warning of conditions on the premises
which present an unreasonable risk of harm, the jury had to
decide the question of whether the condition of the slide in fact
amounted to an unreasonable risk.

It found that the edge of the

slide did not create an unreasonable risk, so that under the law
there was no duty to repair or warn of the condition.
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Therefore,

any discussion of possible duty of the business proprietor to
repair or warn is immaterial, and any possible error with respect
to instruction on the duty of defendant to protect against
unreasonable risk of danger is at best harmless error.
Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
No error . . . in any ruling or order or
in anything done or omitted by the court
. . . is ground for granting a new trial
or otherwise disturbing a judgment or
order, unless refusal to take such action
appears to the court inconsistent with
substantial justice. The court at every
stage of the proceeding must disregard any
error or defect in the proceeding which
does not affect the substantial rights of
the parties.
It is well established that the refusal to give an instruction
cannot be the basis for reversal unless the jury was insufficiently advised of the issue they were to determine, or it
appears that they would have been confused or mislead to the prejudice of the appealing party.
106, 297 P.2d 542 (1956).

In Re Richards Estate, 5 Utah 2d

Likewise, a jury verdict will be

reversed only if the alleged error was substantial and prejudicial to the appellant's rights and there is a reasonable
likelihood that injustice or unfairness has resulted.

Ewell &

Son, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 27 Utah 2d 188, 493 P.2d 1283
(1972).

There must be shown a reasonable likelihood that in the

absence of error, the result would have been different.

Ortega

v. Thomas, 144 Utah 2d 296, 383 P.2d 406 (1963).
Defendant's duties toward invitees like plaintiff are
limited to those risks which are unreasonable.
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It is well

established that the owner of property is not to be regarded as
an insurer for an invitee upon his property.

His duties toward

invitees are limited to those risks which are unreasonable.
Steele v. Denver & Rio Grande, 16 Utah 2d 127, 396 P.2d 751
(1964).

With respect to the duty of care required of owners and

occupiers of land toward invitees, Professor Prosser observed
that, "There is no liability for harm resulting from conditions
from which no unreasonable risk was to be anticipated.11
Law of Torts, 4th Ed., p. 393.

Prosser,

These statements of the law point

out the distinction between two types of risk of harm from
activities or conditions encountered in daily life.

On the one

hand are risks of harm which under all the circumstances are not
unreasonable, even though there may be a remote possibility of
injury.

With respect to these risks, there is no duty owed by

the possessor of land.

On the other hand, there are conditions

which under all the circumstances present an unreasonable risk of
harm, sometimes referred to in the cases as a dangerous condition
or a hazardous condition.

It is only with respect to such

unreasonable risks of harm that the law imposes a duty on the
possessor of land to exercise reasonable care to protect invitees
against the danger by warning or repair.

For this reason, the

issue of reasonable care by the property owner becomes material
only if the condition on the property presented an unreasonable
risk of harm to invitees.
Restatement of the law, Torts §343 (1965) set forth
above provides that a possessor of land is liable to a business
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visitor only if he (a) knows or should know of the condition and
should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm; and
(b) should expect that visitors will not discover the danger and
protect themselves; and (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to
protect them against the danger.

If the jury finds as it did in

this case that the requirement of part (a) was not proved, then
it is entirely unnecessary for the jury to go on to consider the
requirements of part (b) as well as part (c), which is the
requirement of reasonable care to protect business visitors, and
which would include the duty to repair or warn, which plaintiff
claims was not presented to the jury by instruction.
Warning is only one means available to the possessor of
land to exercise reasonable care to protect invitees against the
danger presented by a condition on the land which involves an
unreasonable risk of harm.

The occupier of land may also make

the premises reasonably safe by repair.

But repair or warning

are necessary only where there is an unreasonable risk, and their
purpose is to render the premises reasonably safe [Restatement
(Second) of Torts §343 (1965) comment (d)] not absolutely safe
from all possibility of injury whatsoever.
The jury found based on competent admissible evidence
that the water slide did not present an unreasonable risk of
injury.

Thus it found the water slide was not so dangerous as to

invoke a duty on defendant to exercise reasonable care to protect
plaintiff, as by repair or warning.
Although plaintiff does not challenge directly the suf-

-11-

ficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, plaintiff does
point to testimony of Mr. Neal Citte, part owner and operator of
the water slide at the time of the accident, as showing in plaintiff's view that the water slide was dangerous so as to require
warning or repair.

However, plaintiff overlooks substantial com-

petent evidence on which the jury was entitled to reach the opposite conclusion which it did reach, that the water slide did not
expose plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of injury.

That evi-

dence includes the following:
The fiberglass edge was not sharp or razorlike.

It was

simply the unfinished end of the piece of fiberglass, about oneeighth inch thick, unfinished so that it was not smooth to the
touch.

(R. p. 432)

without being cut.

A person can rub the edge with his hand
(R. p. 567)

There was substantial evidence that riders of the
water slide are able to control their arms and legs during the
ride if they want to, in order to keep their hands and feet from
coming anywhere near the unfinished edge.
Citte, R.

(Testimony of Neal

pp. 471-472, 496; Testimony of former employee Barbara

Lippold, R. pp. 518-519, 523, 529; Testimony of former employee
Betty Durban Mayo, R. pp. 577, 578)
There was substantial evidence that in the absence of
horseplay, riders1 arms and legs do not come close to the outside
edge, and plaintiff was guilty of horseplay in violation of
posted written rules and repeated verbal warnings by employees.
In particular, it is possible to hold back the gentle flow of
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water down the slide by using the plastic mats as a dam or dike
at the starting pool, thereby making the slide much more slippery, resulting in a faster ride.

The speed of a faster ride

throws the rider into the curves with more force, causing the
rider to bank higher on the side of the slide.
warned not to do this.

A large sign

Employees observed plaintiff and his

group holding back the water in this way and warned them to stop.
Plaintiff laughed at the employees, continued to misbehave, and
acted as if he was not concerned.

(R. pp. 449-451, 514-516, 523,

526-527, 543-544, 573-575, 585-586; Exhibit 26D)
The openness and obviousness of the fiberglass edge to
users of the slide is evidence that it did not present an
unreasonable risk of injury, in view of the evidence cited above
that riders are able to control their arms and legs to avoid
coming close to the edge if they wish to do so.

This fiberglass

edge is uniform along both sides of the slide along the full
length of the slide from beginning to end.

There was testimony

the condition was open and obvious to any rider from the time he
approached the entry pool to get on the slide.

Plaintiff rode

the slide from top to bottom on five or six rides before he was
injured, and each time as he entered the slide and as he rode it,
he saw what was there to be seen.

(R. pp. 481-482, 497, 539-542)

Although the absence of prior injuries caused by the
fiberglass edge is not controlling on the issue of whether the
condition presented an unreasonable risk of injury, such evidence
certainly may be considered by the jury.
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Typical injuries on the

water slide include occasional minor cuts and bruises from riders
colliding with each other or with the side wall of the slide.
However, in three and one-half years of operation before this
accident, as many as 700,000 rides down the slide had not
resulted in anyone being cut on the fiberglass edge.

Since the

accident, as many as another 400,000 rides have been taken in two
years up to the time of trial without another such injury.

(R.

pp. 463, 467, 474-476, 554, 560, 561, 576)
The only expert opinion in evidence at trial on the
issue of liability was that the fiberglass edge was not an
unreasonable risk to users of the water slide.

(Testimony of Val

T. Stratford, R. p. 561; Testimony of Neal Citte, R. p. 476)
Plaintiff1s brief quotes testimony by Mr. Citte that it
is possible for persons riding the water slide to lose control of
their arms or legs and allow them to hang over the edge of the
slide.

However, Mr. Citte also testified about his experience

with the water slide and his familiarity with it, and that he did
not recognize the risk of an arm or a leg being cut by the
fiberglass edge as being a hazard, although it could happen.

He

did not post a warning about the fiberglass edge because he did
not feel it presented a problem to users of the water slide,
unless they held back the water in violation of the rules.

(R.

pp. 449-452, 481)
Based on the above evidence, the jury was entitled to
conclude that the fiberglass edge did not amount to an unreasonable risk of harm to plaintiff.

Consequently, defendant had no
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legal duty to repair or warn of the condition.

The absence of

instruction to the jury on the duty to warn was harmless to the
outcome of the trial, and is not a ground for ordering a new
trial.
POINT II
THERE WAS NO DUTY TO WARN OF THE CONDITION
OF THE WATER SLIDE WHICH WAS AS OPEN AND
OBVIOUS TO PLAINTIFF AS TO DEFENDANT.
Even assuming the unfinished edge beyond the lip on each
side of the water slide had amounted to a condition which was
hazardous or dangerous, there is no duty to warn where the condition is as easily observable to the invitee as to the owner.
Restatement (Second) of Torts §343A (1965) states:
§343A.

Known or Obvious Dangers.

(1) A possessor of land is not
liable to his invitees for physical harm
caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known
or obvious to them, unless the possessor
should anticipate the harm despite such
knowledge or obviousness.
Comment (c) to that section adds:
The possessor's activities may
involve a risk which is known or obvious
to those who enter his land, either
because the risk is inherent in the nature
of the activity itself, or because they
are aware that it is carried on in a
manner which involves risks that are not
necessarily inherent in such activities.
Comment (b) adds:
. . . "obvious" means that both the condition and the risk are apparent to and
would be recognized by a reasonable man,
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in the position of the visitor, exercising
ordinary perception, intelligence, and
judgment.
In Ellertson v. Dansie, 576 P.2d 867 (Utah 1978), this
rule was applied to affirm summary judgment for defendant where
plaintiff was injured when he tried to help free a horse which
had become entangled in a chain because of defendant's alleged
negligence in tying the horse to a post.

In Steele v. Denver &

Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., supra, this court affirmed
dismissal as a matter of law of the claim by an automobile driver
who was struck by a train in a railroad crossing after
approaching under conditions which gave the driver a normal
opportunity to see and hear the approach of the train.
Likewise in this case, there was no duty to warn of the
fiberglass edge because of the obviousness of the condition, and
plaintiff cannot complain of the court's decision not to give
an instruction on the duty to warn.
The cases cited by plaintiff are not on point.

In

O'Dell v. Cook's Market, Inc., 432 S.W.2d 382 (Mo.App. 1968), the
court in fact afffirmed a directed verdict against plaintiff and
in favor of defendant in a slip and fall claim, on the grounds
that the substance on the floor of defendant's market was a condition which was as obvious and well known to plaintiff as to
defendant.

In that case, the court referred to the mixture of

water and lettuce or cabbage leaves on the floor of a grocery
market as being a dangerous condition which would invoke a duty
by defendant to remove the substance or warn customers.
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While

the existance of slippery foreign substance on the floors of
retail stores may in some cases create an unreasonable risk of
danger toward invitees, nevertheless the fiberglass edge of the
water slide is an entirely different condition, and plaintiff's
reliance on language in the 0f Dell case about duty to warn of
dangerous conditions begs the question of whether the egde of the
water slide was a dangerous condition, which question the jury
answered in the negative.

Matthews v. Ashland Chemical, Inc.,

703 F.2d 921 (5th Cir. 1983), was plaintiff's appeal from summary
judgment in favor of certain defendants.

Plaintiff was injured

in a propane gas explosion caused by an electric spark from the
motor of a water cooler leased by defendant Ozone Waters, Inc.
and on the premises of defedant Ashland Chemical, Inc.

The Court

of Appeals affirmed summary judgment in favor of Ozone but
reversed the summary judgment in favor of Ashland Chemical,
finding there was a question of fact for the trier of fact on
whether Ashland had created an unreasonable risk of harm to
plaintiff.

As it may apply to the instant case, this opinion is

authority that an injured plaintiff is required to prove that
11

the risk from which his damage resulted posed an unreasonable

risk of harm.11

703 F.2d at 924.

In the instant case, that

question was presented to the jury which answered in the negative.

In Moning v. Alfono, 254 N.W.2d 759 (Mich. 1977), the

Michigan Supreme Court reversed summary judgment for defendants
and remanded for trial, holding there was a jury question on
whether defendants created an unreasonable risk of harm in
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marketing slingshots directly to children.

Again, this decision

is authority that the issue of whether particular conduct amounts
to an unreasonable risk of harm is a question of fact for the
jury.

Although the Michigan Supreme Court discussed the restate-

ment factors of balancing the utility of conduct and the magnitude of the risk in determining whether the summary judgment
should be reversed, nowhere did the court suggest that the
factors bearing on utility of conduct and magnitude of risk must
be presented to the jury in instructions at trial.
POINT III
PLAINTIFF MAY NOT COMPLAIN ABOUT THE JURY
INSTRUCTIONS DEFINING UNREASONABLE RISK
BECAUSE HE DID NOT MAKE A MEANINGFUL
OBJECTION TO THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN AND
DID NOT REQUEST THE INSTRUCTION HE URGES
ON APPEAL.
Point II of appellant's brief on appeal argues that the
trial court failed to instruct the jury about the legal definition of unreasonable risk or the factors to be considered in
deciding whether or not a risk is unreasonable, along the lines
of the balancing test between social utility on the one hand and
the magnitude of risk of injury on the other hand, of §§291 and
292, Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965).
However, at the trial of this case appellant offered to
the court no proposed instructions to the jury which dealt with
any such definition of reasonable risk and unreasonable risk.
Further, the objections which plaintiff stated to the jury
instructions given by the court do not contain any reference to
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the supposed lack of instruction on the definition of reasonable
risk and unreasonable risk.

(R. pp. 500-503)

Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that
the court shall give the parties an opportunity to make objections, and they shall be made, out of the hearing of the jury and
before the jury retires to consider its verdict.
No party may assign as error the giving or
the failure to give an instruction unless
he objects thereto. In objecting to the
giving of an instruction, a party must
state distinctly the matter to which he
objects and the grounds for his objection.
It is well established that a party on appeal may not
assign as error either the giving or the failure to give an
instruction unless he first proposes a correct instruction.

If

the court fails to give the requested instruction, the complaining party must then have made exception on the record in terras
specific enough to give the trial court notice of every error in
the court's instructions which is complained of on appeal.
E. A. Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc. v. W. C. Foy & Sons,
Inc., 665 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1983); Snyderville Transportation Co.,
Inc. v. Christiansen, 609 P.2d 939 (Utah 1980); DeBry &
Hilton Travel Services, Inc. v. Capitol International Airways,
Inc., 583 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1978); Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354
(Utah 1975); Williamson v. Denver & Rio Grande Railway Co., 487
P.2d 316, 26 Utah 2d 178 (1971); State Road Coram, v. Kendell, 438
P.2d 178, 20 Utah 2d 356 (1968).
A claim of error, in regard to failure to instruct the
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jury on a certain theory, cannot be claimed for the first time on
appeal.

Maltby v. Cox Constr. Co., Inc., 598 P.2d 336 (Utah

1979), cert, denied 100 S.Ct. 306, 444 U.S. 945, 26 L.Ed.2d 314.
This is not a case where the Supreme Court in its
discretion and in the interests of justice, should review the
failure to give this instruction in spite of appellant's failure
to request the instruction and make any objection at trial.
Certainly, this Supreme Court may exercise such review in its
discretion.

Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Beehive

Medical Electronics, Inc. v. Square D Co., 669 P.2d 859 (Utah
1983); E. A. Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc. v. W. C. Foy &
Sons, Inc., supra.

Such review is limited to unusual circum-

stances where some gross injustice or inequity would otherwise
result.
This trial was conducted in a regular manner, and adequate opportunity was given to counsel to submit proposed
instructions and state objections on the record.

Plaintiff

availed himself of both of these opportunities on other matters,
but with respect to the error he now claims, he neither submitted
a proposed instruction nor took exception.
In the present case, the fact that the court did not
instruct the jury on the definition of reasonable risk and
unreasonable risk now urged by plaintiff on appeal, in the
absence of any suggestion from plaintiff at trial that such
instruction should have been given, is certainly not a gross
injustice or inequity, where the concept of reasonable risk and
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unreasonable risk was discussed in the court's instruction in the
explanation to Special Interrogatory No. 1, within the standard
of whether the risk would have been acceptable to an ordinary
prudent person exercising reasonable care.

It should be noted

that this instruction language is substantially similar to the
wording of Restatement (Second) §343 which plaintiff did propose
as his requested jury instruction No. 3, that an unreasonable
risk of harm was one which would have been realized as such by a
person in the position of defendant with the exercise of reasonable care.

In other words, plaintiff obtained as much jury

instruction on the definition of unreasonable risk, as he asked
for.
Finally, plaintiff waived his right on appeal to claim
error in the trial court instruction on unreasonable risk because
he did not preserve that claim in his docketing statement.

Rule

9, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, as well as its predecessor,
Rule 73A, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that the mandatory docketing statement on appeal shall contain the issues
presented by the appeal.

Plaintiff filed an unsuccessful motion

for a new trial and also filed a docketing statement in this
appeal, and in neither document does he suggest that the trial
court committed error in failing to define reasonable risk and
unreasonable risk in instructions to the jury.

Plaintiff1s only

claim up to that point was that the court failed to instruct the
jury that defendant had a duty to remove or guard any dangerous
condition or give warning, as plaintiff claimed the rule to be
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under §343 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.

Defendant then

filed a motion for summary disposition of this appeal, pointing
out that the issue was harmless error because since the jury
found that the condition of the slide did not amount to an
unreasonable risk of danger under §343, there was no duty to
repair or warn.

It was only subsequent to the filing and denial

of this motion for summary disposition that plaintiff for the
first time raised the issue of instructions on the definition of
unreasonable risk, in his appeal brief.

Under these circum-

stances, plaintiff waived his right to make this argument on
appeal.
POINT IV
THE COURT INSTRUCTED THE JURY PROPERLY
ON THE STANDARD OF REASONABLE RISK AND
UNREASONABLE RISK UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
Taking all of the instructions together as a whole, the
jury was told that an unreasonable risk was one of such magnitude
that an ordinary, prudent person exercising reasonable care would
know the exposure was unacceptable.

The jury was told that it

should determine whether or not leaving the edge as it was left
exposed the business patrons to an unreasonable risk of injury,
or whether leaving the edge as it was left was reasonable and,
therefore, not negligent.

Negligence was properly defined as

"the failure to do what a reasonable and prudent person would
have done under the circumstances, or doing what such person
under the circumstances would not have done.
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The fault may lie

in acting or in omitting to act."
Therefore, the jury was fully instructed not only on the
negligence standard in abstract, but also on the application of
that standard to the condition of the water slide as it existed
at the time of plaintiff's injury.
and appropriate.

This guidance was adequate

If plaintiff's counsel had felt the need to

inform the jury of plaintiff's position that the condition of the
water slide showed very low social utility and unacceptable risk
of danger, he was free to do so in closing argument by urging
that reasonable and prudent people in the position of defendant
would not tolerate such a risk to customers.
This case was tried on a theory of negligence, and the
jury was instructed on the basis of the negligence standard of
care.

In addition, the jury was given particular instruction

applying that standard of care to the condition of the water
slide.

Plaintiff's argument that the court committed error in

not giving additional instruction detailing the specific factors
which are considered in determining the utility of an actor's
conduct and the magnitude of risk under §§292 and 293, would
require detail in the instructions which would be neither
necessary nor reasonable, and would be more likely to confuse the
jury than to provide further guidance.
Restatement (Second) of Torts, §282 (1965) defines
negligence in the context of reasonable risk and unreasonable
risk:
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§282.

Negligence Defined.

In the Restatement of this Subject, negligence is conduct which falls below the
standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable
risk of harm. * * *
It is evident that a proper definition of negligence by
reference to the conduct of a reasonable and prudent person under
the circumstances, which was the instruction given by the court,
implicitly provides for a finding on the reasonableness of the
risk of harm, since by definition, negligent conduct involves an
unreasonable risk.

Nowhere in the jurisprudence of this state

has it been found necessary to offer additional instructions on
balancing social utility and magnitude of risk in negligence
actions, and the trial court in this case certainly did not abuse
its discretion in instructing the jury as it did.

Plaintiff has

pointed to no decision in any jurisdiction which held it was
reversible error to fail to give the instructions which plaintiff
urges.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, defendant/respondent
requests that the court affirm the judgment entered by the trial
court on the jury verdict.
Dated this

/ [

day of June, 1985.
STRONG

fr^^fl

C

Roger H. Bullock
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
WALTER WAGONER,

)

Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

)
)

WATERSLIDE INCORPORATED dba
BURCHCREEK WATERSLIDE,

)
)
)
Defendant/Respondent. )

vs.

Case No. 20410

)

GREAT BASIN ENGINEERING,

)

Third-Party Defendant.)
ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

The Court's Instruction No. 2 to the
jury

R. pp. 350-357

The Court's Instruction No. 3 to the
jury

R. p. 358

Judgment on the Jury Verdict

R. pp. 389-390

Drawing of straight section of water
slide
Drawing of curved section of water
slide
Photograph of entry pool or starter

Trial Exhibit 1P
p. 12
Trial Exhibit 1P
p. 14
Trial Exhibit 10D

pool at beginning of slide
Photograph of water slide

Trial Exhibit 13D

Photograph of water slide

Trial Exhibit 15D

Photograph of fiberglass edge

Trial Exhibit 20D
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INSTRUCTION NO.

"

You will not render a general verdict as is sometimes
done, but rather your function herein is to make findings of fact
as to special interrogatories or questions which
submitted to you.

are herewith

In making your findings of fact, you should

bear in mind that the burden of proof in any disputed fact rests
on the party claiming the fact to be true and he must prove it by
a preponderance of the evidence.
Before you answer

"yes" to any question

submitted to

you, you must find the same to be true by a preponderance of the
evidence.
the

This requires the agreement of six (three-quarters) of

jurors

to

answer

any

question

and

at

least

six

(three-quarters) of the jurors must agree that the answer to the
question should be "yes" or "no" before such an answer may be
made.
A special verdict form is as follows:

350

INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Do you find it proven by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
was negligent in the manner in which he used the
slides with the edge as it was and did expose the
plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of injury?
YES
NO

EXPLANATION:

The jury is instructed that all parties

invited to a business premise are entitled in law to presume that
the premises are reasonably safe for the conducting of business
activity.

They

may

act

on

this

assumption

happens to put them on notice to the contrary.

until

something

If they discover,

or with the exercise of ordinary care should have discovered,
that a hazard was present then they should act as a reasonably
prudent person should act under the circumstances to avoid that
hazard.

The business has a right to assume that people will act

safely for their concern.

If the business discovers that its

patrons are not exercising ordinary care, then he must take such
action

as

a

reasonably

prudent

person

would

under

the

circumstances.
The
surrounding

nature

of

the

activity

it may be discovered

and

the

by the parties.

circumstances
In sports

activity, a person assumes the ordinary risks that are well-known
in the sport.

An example of this is someone who sits himself in

the right field bleachers in a baseball park.

He is assumed to

know, or hope, that a baseball may strike the area and he assumes

351

that

risk.

However,

if

the

ball

park

manager

allowed

the

bleachers to get in such a state of disrepair that they collapsed
then this would not be an assumed risk*
the

nature

of

the

activity

on

the

The jury should consider
defendant's

premises

and

determine whether or not leaving the edge as it was left exposed
the

business

whether

patrons

leaving

to

an

unreasonable

risk

the edge as it was left was

therefore, not negligent.

of

injury, or

reasonable

and,

They would be entitled to assume that

the guest knew the ordinary, accepted risk in the sport, but it
would be unreasonable to expose the customers to a risk of such
magnitude that an ordinary, prudent person exercising reasonable
care would know the exposure was unacceptable.
The plaintiff alleges that leaving the edge as it was
left

exposed

him

to

an

unreasonable

risk

of

injury.

The

defendant denies that this was an exposure to an unreasonable
risk.

The Court instructs the jury to determine whether or not

the plaintiff has carried his burden of proof on this issue.

If

the plaintiff has carried his burden of proof, you should answer
this question "yes".

If you answer the question "no", return to

the courtroom as you have disposed of the case.

If you answer

the question "yes", answer Interrogatory No. 1A, the following
question.
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INTERROGATORY NO. 1A: Do you find it proven by a
preponderance of the evidence that the negligence
referred to in Interrogary No. 1 was a proximate
cause of the cutting of plaintiff's extension
tendon on his right toe?
YES
NO
EXPLANATION:

The phrase "proximate cause" is defined in

a separate instruction.

The plaintiff

alleges that there was

present an unreasonable risk of injury, and that that risk is the
proximate cause of his injuries.

The defendant alleges that even

if the jury answers the first question "yes", their negligence
was not a proximate cause of the injury.

Further, defendant

alleges that the plaintiff's misuse of the slide was the sole
proximate cause of his injury.

This issue is left for the jury

to determine whether or not plaintiff has carried the burden of
proof.

If you answer Question 1A "yes", answer the following

question, otherwise return to the courtroom.
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Do you find it proven by a
preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff
was contributorily negligent in that he misused
the equipment at the time his toe was injured?
YES
NO

EXPLANATION;
on this allegation.

The burden of proof is upon the defendant
Unless they carry it by a preponderance of

the evidence plaintiff would be entitled to an answer of "no".
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All persons are expected to use ordinary care to avoid injuring
themselves.

They are required to make the ordinary observations

to adapt their conduct to that of a reasonably prudent person.
The

defendant

alleges

that

the

circumstantial

evidence

here

presented demonstrates that the injury could not have occurred
had the plaintiff not been misusing the equipment in holding back
the water

or taking other

unreasonable

denies any misuse of the equipment.

risks.

The plaintiff

The burden of proof is on

the defendant to prove that the answer to this question should be
"yes".
INTERROGATORY NO. 2A: Do you find it proven by a
preponderance of the evidence that the negligence
found present in Question No. 2 was a proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injuries?
xES
NO

EXPLANATION:

The phrase

elsewhere in the instructions.

"proximate cause" is defined

The defendant alleges that the

circumstantial evidence proves that the accident occurred during
improper

use

of

the

equipment,

and

also

alleges

that

the

circumstantial evidence shows that the proximate cause of the
injury would have to be some misuse of the equipment.

The burden

of

proof

is on the

negligence

was

one

defendant
of

Plaintiff denies this.
If
negligent

you

have

the

to prove

proximate

that

causes

the
of

plaintiff's
the

injury.

The burden of proof is on the defendant.
found

that

both

of

the

parties

were

and that their negligence was a proximate cause of

plaintiff's

injuries,

then

you

must

answer

the

following

question.
INTERROGATORY NO, 3: Considering all of the fault
that caused the injury to be 100%, what share of
the percentage should be assigned to each of the
parties?
Plaintiff:

%

Defendant:

i.

TOTAL:

EXPLANATION:

100%

The law provides that if a plaintiff is

more at fault in causing his own injuries, then he cannot use the
courts and recover thereby.

Therefore, if each of the parties is

50% to blame, there can be no recovery.

If the defendant is more

at fault than the plaintiff, then the plaintiff may recover to
the extent that the injury was caused by the defendant.

In other

words, if the apportionment was 75% the defendant's fault and 25%
the plaintiff's fault, the plaintiff recovery would be limited to
75%.

The jury does not make this calculation but gives the judge

the total figure and the judge reduces it appropriately.
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The law provides no formula for figuring the percentage
of faultf this is left to the discretion of the jury.
If you answer that the defendant was negligent and his
negligence was a proximate cause of the injury, and that the
plaintiff was not negligent or his negligence was less than 50%
of the proximate cause of the injury, then you must determine the
amount

to

award

plaintiff,

which

is

the

basis

of

the

next

question.
INTERROGATORY NO, 4;
What sum do you find it
proven by a preponderance of the evidence is
proper to award plaintiff in each of the following
categories?
a) past (before trial) special
medical expenses

$

b) past lost wages

$

c) future medical expenses

$

d) future lost earnings

$

e) general damages (up to
date of trial)
f) future general damages

$
$_

TOTAL AWARD

$_

EXPLANATION:

You are instructed that if the plaintiff

has proven that he is entitled to damages, they should be awarded
to the degree that he has shown them to be present by a preponderance of the evidence, or with

reasonable medical

certainty

will occur in the future.
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The plaintiff alleges that all of the damages he has
suffered were caused by the initial negligence of the defendant.
The defendant contends that even if he is held responsible for
the intial injury of the plaintiff, the award should be reduced
and not include any

damages

brought

on by

a failure

of

the

plaintiff to care for his own injury or injury resulting from an
event that is sufficiently remote that in common sense should be
a separate event.

Defendant alleges that the breaking of the pin

was not caused by the cut on the toe.
was.

The issue is left to the jury.

The plaintiff alleges it
The burden of proof is on

the plaintiff.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

^

Negligence is the failure to do what a reasonable and
prudent person would have done under the circumstances, or doing
what such person under such circumstances would not have done.
The fault may lie in acting or in omitting to act.

ROGER H. BULLOCK #4 85
STRONG & HANNI
Attorney for Defendant
Sixth Floor Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY,
S\)

STATE OF UTAH

—

)¥-

WALTER WAGONER,
Plaintiff,

<a

vs.
WATERSLIDE INCORPORATED dba
BURCH CREEK WATERSLIDE,
Defendant,

4

/

JUDGMENT
Civil

No.

83567

vs.
GREAT BASIN ENGINEERING,
Third-Party
Defendant.
The above entitled matter having come on duly for
trial, Honorable John F. Wahlquist presiding, on October 2 and 3,
1984, with plaintiff represented by counsel, James R. Hasenyager,
and defendant represented by counsel, Roger H. Bullock, and thirdparty defendant represented by counsel, Jack L. Schoenhals,
And a jury having been duly impaneled, and evidence
having been adduced by all parties, and the court and jury having
heard arguments of counsel, and the jury having been duly instructed
in the law and having deliberated and returned its verdict in

4'
389

A

130!

422- .

answer to special interrogatories as follows:
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Do you find it proven
by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant was negligent in the manner in
which he used the slides with the edge as
it was and did expose the plaintiff to an
unreasonable risk of injury?
YES
NO

X

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that third-party defendant Great Basin Engineering does have and
recover a directed verdict against defendant and third-party
plaintiff on the third-party complaint, no cause of action; and
defendant Waterslide, Incorporated dba Burch Creek Waterslide
does and recover judgment against plaintiff on the complaint, no
cause of action, together with costs.
DATED t h i s /

day of October, 1984.

n

. .

^

//

A
/

/
<U

John F. WanTquist, Judg

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a .true and correct copy of the foregoing
Judgment was mailed, postage prepaid, this

fVjJbhAl

^^day

of

1984, t o :
James R. Hasenyager
Attorney for Plaintiff
635 Twenty-Fifth Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
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